 a l a e s o f s t a t e , t b e o p t i m a l~e s c a n b e o b t a i n e d b 
In the present paper, we develop an analogous theory for continuoustime systems. We first derive a counterpart of Radner's theorem for two-member continuous-time linear-quadratic static team problems when the statistics of the random variables involved are not necessarily Gussian. Existence and uniqueness of the solution is established, and it is shown that the team-optimal solution satisfies a pair of integral equations which can be solved as the limit of a convergent iterative scheme.
For the special case of Gaussian distributions, however, the team-optimal solution of the static team problem is affine in the observation of each DM, with the coefficients involved satisfying a pair of linear integral equations. It is M e r shown that the solution of these integral equations are related to the solution of a time-invariant matrix equation of Liapunov type when the cost function assigns only terminal quadratic wst to the state variables. Finally, the static theory is extended to LQG continuous-time dynamic team problems with discrete observations, under the quasiclassical one-step-delay observation sharing pattern. The unique team-optimal solution is obtained explicitly, which is again affine in the information available to each DM. 
GENERAL FOR~RTLATION OF THE DYNAWC TZAM PROBLEM
Let ( x I , t > t o } denote an n-dimensional stochastic process satisfying the Ito differential equation and whose sample paths are continuous. Here, x . is a Gaussiaa random vector with mean Eo and covariance X,, and (wl, t > t o } is an ndimensional standard Wiener process. A ( -) , B'(-), E2(-), and F(-) are appropriate dimensional matrices with continuous entries on [tO,tf] .
{ u : , t > to} and { u:, t > t o ) are, respectively, rl-and r,dimensional stochastic processes denoting the controls of DM1 and DM2, respectively.
The decision makers make independent sampled noisy measurements of the state. Spdically, it is assumed that an mi-dimensional observation isavailabletoDMiatthesampledtimeinstanttiwherej=O,1;~~,N-1, and ro < I , < . . -< t N -I < t N =rf. Let 9 . is an observation matrix of appropriate dimensions.
We now adopt a quasi-chsicd information pattern for this decision problem. Specifically, it is assumed that the decisionmakers exchange their independent sampled observations with a delay of one sampling interval. Such an information pattern is known as the one-step&lay obsenvltion sharing partern [SI.
Mathematidy speaking, the information available to DMi in the time interval [ $ , t , + , ) isqj whereqj={$,6,-,}, and Si-' denotes the common information available to the decision makers in the same sampling interval, i.e., Let u , ! denote the sigma-algebra generated by the information set q:.
Further, let Hh denote the class of second-order stochastic processes {u:,r>rO), which satisfy the requirement that their restriction to the interval [ti, ti+,) is $-measurable, for all j E 0 . Then, a permissible decision law (strategy) for DMi is a mapping y': [ 
III. STATIC TEAM PROBLEM

A. A More General Formulation
In the static version of the dynamic team problem formulated in the previous section, the decision makers make noisy linear observations of the random initial state xo, and do not acquire any further information as the decision process proceeds. Hence, the static version can be recovered from the previous general formulation by simply setting N = 1. In this section, we actually first treat a more general version of this static problem, in which x. is a second-order random vector with known (but not necessarily G a u s s i a n ) statistics, and the static observationy' of DMI is not related to x. necessarily in a linear f e o n . In fact, we only assume that the conditional joint probability distribution of (y ', y 2 ) given x. is a priori known, but this distribution need not be Gaussian.
When the information structure of each DM is static in nature, it is not necessary to differentiate between a strategy and its realized value (control), and hence, hereafter in this section, we will only consider the controls { u:, t 2 t o ) and { u:, t > to} as the decision variables of interest.
consistent with this adoption, we will investigate the minimkhg solution in the product space H: X H: instead of in ri Xr:. Here, Hi stands, by abuse of notation, for the modified version of H i (introduced in Section II) with N = 1, that also accoullts for the more general (not necessarily Gaussian) statistics introduced above. The same statement applies to r;, too. We now introduce an inner product (---) i on Hi through the relation for each pair (UEH;, o E H l } where oEQ, with (Q,%, 9) denoting the underlying probability space. Together with t h i s h e r product, and for each i= 1.2, H;' becomes a Hilbert space which we simply denote by Hi.
To complete the formulation of the static team problem, we let h , a t , , t , ] x Q ) denote the space of functions from [ t O , t f ] X B into R", under the inner product 
B. Existence of a Unique Team-Optimal Solution
The Hilbert space setting formulation given above leads to a rather simple proof of existence and uniqueness of the minimkhg solution { d o , uzo}, as well as to a set of two coupled linear equations that the desired solution satisfies. Let us first define a Volterra operator (see [lo] PrmJ Since J is continuously differentiable and strictly convex on H' X H z , every person-by-person optimal solution is also team-optimal, and furthemore, the first-order conditions are also sufficient. Hence, the result follows by taking the Gateaux variations of J separately with respect to u' and u2, and by setting them equal to zero.
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The following lemma now proves existence and uniqueness of the mhimizhg solution.
Lemma 2: The pair of equations (12) admits a unique solution.
Proof: Let us first note that (12) can also be written as where e: H' X H Z + L z f a t 0 ,~, ] X Q ) is defined as e= (&,&) , and Z is the identity operator mappmg H' X H2 into itself. Then, it readily follows that (12) admits a unique solution if, and only if, (Z+e*Qe) is invertible. Now, since e, is a Volterra operator, it is completely continuous (i.e., compact) [lo] , and so is its adjoint Ef . This implies that L? and e* are also compact. Furthermore, Q is a bounded operator. Since the product of compact and bounded operators is compact [lo] , it now follows that e*Qk!is compact, which is also self-adjoint and nonnegative.
This, then, implies that the operator (Z+E*Qe) is indeed invertiile, since it is the sum of an identity operator (with is strongly positive) and a nonnegatiw self-adjoint compact operator.
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C. Functional Equations for the Team-Optimal Solution
We now seek to obtain, as an equivalent counterpart of (12), a set of functional (iitegral) equations that the team-optimal solution should satis@. To this end, we start with the operator form (12) and f i i rewrite those equations as where xo denotes the optimal team trajectory. By utilizing certain standard properties of adjoint operators, we can show (see [22, Appendix ID that has the functional form
~~( w ) = I~~B~(~) ' O ( S ,~) ' E [ Z~(~)~U~] dF+Bi(t)'~(t,,i)'E[z;,(o)lui]
f (15) and u' stands for the sigma-algebra generated by the information set of DMi. This result, together with some routine, but cumbersome, manipulations applied to (14), leads to the following result, whose proof can be found in [22] .
heo or em I: The unique optimal solution {u'"EH~, U~O E H Z ) of the static team problem satisfies, and is the unique solution of, the following pair of coupled integral equations:
where Si(t), i= 1,2 are the unique nonnegative definite matrix function solutions of the Riccati equations
~'(t)=-A(f)'S'(f)-S'(t)A(i)-Q(r)+S'(r)B'(t)B'(i)'S'(r),
(174 W ( t , s), i= 1,2, are the state transition matrices for the systems
i = ( A ( t ) -B ' ( f ) B ' ( t ) ' S ' ( t ) ) x ;
and where kf, i= 1,2, satisfy
Ij=S'(t) O ( t , t o ) E [ x o ( w ) l o ' ]
if(o)=-(A(t)'-S'(t)B'(r)B'(r)')k:(o)-S'(r)BJ(r)E[ u{"(o)ld]
k;,(w)=O; j + i , j~{ I , 2 } .
When the underlying statistics are not Gaussian, it is, in general, quite difficult to solve the pair of equations (16) 3) Use the solution of (16b) obtained at step 2 to replace the starting Proposition I: 1) In the preceding algorithm, the corresponding linear integral equations at each step admit a unique solution.
2) Regardless of the initial choice, the infinite second guessing algorithm converges to the unique optimal solution.
Proof: First note that, for each u2 eH2, (16a) constitutes a necessary and sufficient condition for Y' EH' to minimize J(u', u 2 ) over HI.
Likewise, (16b) provides a necessary and sufficient condition for minimization of J(ul, u2) over H 2 , for each fixed u' EH'. Hence, the proposition readily follows, since J is continuously differentiable and strictly convex on H' X H 2 and it has a unique minimum (Lemmas 1 and 2). 0 resulting equation for the corresponding u1 E H'. choice at step 1, and reiterate.
D. The Speciat Cme of Gaussian Stafktics
When the underlying statistics are Gaussian, it is possible to determine the structure of the team-optimal controls explicitly, To this end, and in view of the formulation of the general problem in Section II, let xo-N(Fo, 2,) and the observation y' of DMi be given as
where q-N(O, R'), R'>O, and these three random vectors are statistically independent. Now, consider the iterative algorithm of the previous subsection, starting at step 1 with u2=0 as. Then, the resulting expression for uj is
so that u: is really a linear function of E[xolu'], which, in turn, is affine in y ' because of the underlying Gaussian statistics. Now, if this functional form is substituted in ( l a ) , at step 2, it follows through a similar argument (but this time via the solution of a linw differential equation) that the solution u: will be affine in y2, again because of Gaussian statistics. This argument then iteratively yields (also in view of Proposition 1) the conclusion that, when the underlying statistics are Gaussian, the unique team-optimal solution is affine in the information available to each DM. We have, in fact, the following.
Theorem 2:
The continuous-time two-member LQG static team problem formulated in this section admits the unique solution
u~o~~' ( r ) [ y~-C '~o ] -B ' ( t ) ' S ( t ) 4 ( t , f o ) f o m a )
~~~=~~( i ) [ y~-C~F~] -B~(~) ' S ( r ) + ( f (ab)
where S(r), io < t < i,, is the unique nonnegative definite matrix function solution of the Riccati equation 
S ( r ) +~( r ) '~( r ) +~( t )~( t ) -~( t ) [~' ( f )~l (~) ' +~2 ( t )~2 ( f ) ' ] S(r)+Q(t)=O, S ( t , ) = Q f *
and
K ' ( t ) = -(A(t)'-Si(t)B'(t)B'(t)')Ki(i)-S'(r)Bi(t)Pi(t)c'Zi,
Proof: A proof of this theorem is provided in the Appendix. 0
We obtain extremely simple expressions for the optimal uso, i= 1,2, in the special case when Q(t)=O, i.e., if no cost is assigned to the intermediate values of the state vector. ufo= -B ' ( t ) ' K ( t ) B ( t , t o ) D ' o [~' -C '~~] -B ' (~) ' S ( t )~( t ,~o ) K ( t ) B ( t , t o ) D~0 [ y~-C~~o ] -B~( t ) ' S ( t )~( t , t , ) Proof: Details are given in [22] .
We now obtain an expression for the minimum value of the cost function of the static LQG team problem solved in the previous subsee tion. The results to be derived in the sequel w i l l especially be useful in the derivation of the optimal solution of the dynamic LQG team problem in Section IV. Let and is independent of the controls.
Proof: This result follows from the standard "completing the square" argument of LQ stochastic control [13] by appropriate decomposition. 0 Now, to obtain an expression for the minimum team cost, it will be sufficient to substitute the optimal team solution given in Theorem 2 into J . If this is done, then the integral term in (2Sa) reads 
Let us now decompose x: into two parts and write it as x: =m, +E, where m, and t,, respectively, satisfy
-_ dm, -A(t)m, -[~' ( t )~' ( t~+~2 ( t )~~o r k ( t ,
to)mo, dt mo =Fo (31a)
d~, = A ( t )~, d t -( B ' (~) P ' ( t ) [~' -C '~~]
+B2(t)p2(r)[y2-c2z o ] ) d t + F ( t ) d~, , &=xO-Zo,. (31b)
The solution of (31a) can readily be obtained as
m, =9(t. t o ) 5
where # ( t , s ) is defined by (22) . Then, if the decomposition x; = +(t, to)%, +& is used in (29), the resulting expression becomes only a function of the stochastic process {t,, t > to), Le., it can be written as
~~{ I I P~(~) [ C~~, +~' ] + B~( I ) ' S (~)~, I~~
+IIP2(t)[C2[o+u2]+B2(t)'S(t).&l12}dt. (32)
This expression can further be simplified by making use of the solution of (31b) and the statistical independence property of to, u' and 0' . The f i i form is given below as the second term of expression (34) and the result is summarjzed in Lemma 4. The details of the manipulations involved to arrive at expression ( 3 4 ) will not be given here since they are rather straightfornard (although cumbersome) and not that interesting for our purposes. What is important to note is the structure of the minimum value ( a s a function of 4 ) given in Lemma 4.
Preliminary N o W n for Lemma 4:
Define the appropriate dimensional matrix functions Ai(-), Ai(-),
A!(.), A:(-), A%.), A%*) on [to. 9 1 as
A;(t)=P'(t)C'+B'(t)'S(t)@(t,t,) -B ' ( t ) ' S ( t )~f @ ( t . s ) B i ( s )~i ( s ) d r C i t 0 -B'(t)'S(t)/'o(t,s)Bys)pj(s)drC',
Io izj, i , j = 1,2. (33a)
A~( t ) = P ' ( f ) + B ' ( f ) ' S ( t ) l ' B ( t , s ) B ' ( s ) P ' ( s ) d r ; i=1,2, t 0
(33b)
A~(t)=B'(t)'S(f)l'B(t,s)B'(s)P'(s)dF; i+j, i,j=1,2.
IO (33c)
Further, let
J , = J , + T r (Ab(t)'Ai(t)+A2,(t).a2,(t))Zo
i:f
+ (~: ( t ) '~: ( t ) + a : ( t ) '~~( t ) ) R '
+(A:( t)' n:( t ) +a' ,( t)' a;( t ) )~* where J, is given by (34) and is independent of -To.
+S(t)'(B'(t)B'(t)'+B2(t)BZ(t)')S(t) -i?(t, c)F(T)F(T)'@(~,
T
N. SOLUTION OF THE DYNAMIC TEAM PROBLaM
The solution of the dynamic LQG team problem formulated in Section I1 can now be obtained by making use of the static theory developed in the previous section. The derivation basically involves a dynamic programming type of argument, and one has to utilize Theorem 2 and Lemma 4 at every sampling time interval. In the sequel, this w i l l be achieved by first enlarging the strategy spaces of the decisionmakers so as to formulate a new team problem whose team-optimal solution can be obtained more readily, and then by relating the solution of the original team problem to the one obtained for the auxiliary one. Such an indirect derivation seems to be inevitable, since otherwise the analysis gets quite cumbersome.
The only difference between the new dynamic team problem to be introduced and the original one lies in the information patterns. Specifically,-the new one is defined by replacing q; and 8,-I, given by (3), by ijj we will obtain one such representation which is, in fact, the simplest one to derive; and then we solve implicit equations of the type (38) to obtain the desired optimal team solution. where It should be noted that the matrix X(.), as well as the sample paths of { z f , r>rO}, have discontinuities at the sampling points t l , ---, t N --. Now, we have the following result. can confine our attention to the f i t term of (43c), which we may denote by JN-l where we define, in genaal,
That is, first conditioned on the common information S;-available to the decisionmakers in the sampling interval [ti, t , . + I ) , and then full expecta-$on. Now, note that the probability distriiution of conditioned on is Gaussian (because of h e a r state dynamics and linear observation equations) and furtheamore, it has mean it,,-, and covariance Z(t;-l) by Lemma 6. Then, the team problem defined by JN-' b e comes equivalent to the static LQG team problem of Section III-D, with only to replaced by t N -] , Fo by &N-,, Zo by Z(t;-l) and C'by CA-]. Consequently, the result of Theorem 2 directly applies here, implying that the solution will be given by where (F'(-),?'(-)} w i l l be given by a pair of equations, which is a counterpart of (23). Now, if this solution is substituted into JN-', we know from Lemma 4 that it will have the functional form where the second term is given as a counterpart of (34) and does not depend on the past controls (or strategies). Furthermore, replacing in the preceding expression by i , , -, we can express its first term as which is equivalent to using standard properties of conditional mean. Hence, while determining the pair ii-z}, the expression of interest is [also from (43~11 since E(.) is independent of the controls. But, this team problem is analogous to the one considered on the sampling interval [ t N -, , t N ) , thereby admitting a solution in the structural form (45). Prcceeding in this manner, we obtain, by induction, the following proposition.
Pre@imny notation for Proposition 2:
Let X$ be appropriate dimensional matrices defined by Let ?I(-), iz(.) be piecewise continuous functions on [to, t,] , which satisfy the coupled set of linear integral equations ,+,,j=O,l,...,N- 
i ' ( r ) -B l ( t y s ' ( r ) l '~( f , s ) B~( s ) B~( s )~~~(~) d p -B~( : ) '~~ i~( r ) = B 2 ( t y s 2 ( t )~'~( t , S ) B 2 ( S ) B Z ( s y~~( S ) d p --B Z ( t ) '~~( t )
'
-( A ( t ) ' -s ' ( t ) B ' ( t ) B ' (~y )~~( t ) -S ' ( t ) B k ( t )~k ( r )~&
s ' ( t ) --A ( t ) ' S ' ( t ) -S i ( t ) A ( t ) -Q ( t ) + s i ( f ) B i ( t ) B i ( t ) '~( t ) , t i -] < t < t j , Si(ti)=S(ti),
i=1,2, j = N , . --, I ,
while Ti( I , s) is the state transition matrix of the system x=(A(t)-Bi(t)Bi(t)'s'(t))x, t E [ t i , t i + J , i=1,2, j e .
Pq@tion,2:
1) The set of equations (50) admits a unique solution pair {PI(.), Pz(-)}.
2) The LQG dynamic team problem of Section 11, and under the amended information structure ({I, iZ), admits an optimal solution whose restriction to the sampling interval [ t,, t,+ is
i'O((t,il)=?l(t)[~~-~li,,]-E1(t~S(t)J/(t,ti)i,, (5h) ~z 0 (~,~2 ) =~2 ( t ) [~z -~z i t , ] -B Z ( t ) ' S ( t )~( t , t i ) i~,
(52b) t j < t < I i + l , j = O , -* -, N -l .
Proofr 1) This result readily follows from Theorem 2, since the pair of equations (SO) on each sampling interval is analogous to the pair (23).
2) The inductive argument for derivation of this optimal solution has already been outlined prior to the statement of this proposition.
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It should be noted that we cannot claim uniqueness of the solution presegted above, in view of Remark 1. In fact, all pairs of strategies in ri xr$ that provide the same minimum value for J will be different representations of {f", fzo}. One such representation will, however, lie in rk x r;, which will constitute the unique solution of the original team problem by Lemma 5. This particular representation is given below in furthermore, it does not discuss the existence and uniqueness questions thoroughly investigated in this paper. One natural (although not straightforward) extension of the results of this paper would be to obtain Nash equilibria of similarly structured stochastic nonzero-sum differential game problems. For a counterpart of Lemma 2 to be valid in that case, one has to impose certain additional restrictions on the parameters of the problem. This has actually been done in [a] where authors obtain a sufficient condition for the LQG nonzero-sum differential game to admit a unique Nash equilibrium solution under static information. For the dynamic continuous-time LQG nonzero-sum differential game, and under the one-step-delay o b servation sharing pattern of this paper, Nash equilibria wiU again be unique whenever it exists, and the equilibrium strategies of the d e cisionmakers (players) will be affine in their information, i.e., a direct counterpart of the result of [21] w i l l hold true for the continuous-time problem also. A verification of this result, however, will require an analysis quite different from the one employed in Section iv of this paper, since Lemma 5 has no counterpart in a game situation. Details of this analysis, as well as the expressions for the unique equilibrium strategies, will be presented in a forthcoming paper. where X' is given by expression (25). From the discussion prior to the statement of Theorem 2, we see that, when Zo=O, the optimal ufo are b e a r functions of y', i = 1,2. n u s , we can write u T = P ( t ) y ' Where P ' ( f ) are to be determined. Using this form in (16a) and (I&), we get (23a) and (23b). An obvious iterations scheme is to start with P2(r)E0, determine P'(f), and iterate. The iteration converges on account of the convergence of the second guessing scheme. We now want to extend this result to the case when Zo#O. For this, we first take another look at the criterion. The system state evolves according to (1) and the criterion to be minimized is (4). Let But this is the -tion problem with zero mean initial condition, which has already been solved. In fact, the optimal solution is I j ; = P ( t ) y ' , i= 1,2 where P'(t), i= 1,2, satisfy the pair (23a), (23b). This yields Y. C Ho and IL C Chu, T e a m decision thwry and information slructlues in
